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PURE AS RUNNING WATER: A CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
FOR UTAH’S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Brandon S. Fuller*
In the West, “Whiskey is for drinkin’ and water’s for fightin’.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Water rights in America, particularly in western states, have been a pervasive
source of legal contention.2 The histories of these water rights, and the public trust
doctrine more broadly,3 have created a tremendously complex area of law. This field
of law is very old and draws on policy concerns stretching back to 100 B.C.,
overlapping federal and state powers and precedents, and what can only be described
as one of the longest games of jurisprudential telephone in existence.4 As a result,
anyone seeking to challenge a state statute, court opinion, or regulation, which they
believe impermissibly restricts the public’s right to use the waters, has a big job
ahead of them. The party must take on the daunting task of organizing hundreds of
years of law into a coherent argument and accounting for every nuance which may
lurk in a myriad of state and federal opinions published on the issue.5
*

© 2019 Brandon S. Fuller. Fuller is a third-year law student at the University of Utah
S.J. Quinney College of Law. First and foremost, I would like to thank my grandfather,
Douglas A. Smith, for instilling in me the importance of water rights in the State of Utah. I
would also like to thank the Utah Law Review board and staff—in particular Kayla Weiser,
Jennifer Joslin, and the Junior Staff Copyworkers—for their tireless work and attention to
detail.
1
Though this quote is often attributed to Mark Twain, it is uncertain whether Twain
actually said it. Whiskey Is for Drinking; Water Is for Fighting Over, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR
(June 3, 2013), https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/06/03/whiskey-water/ [https://perma.cc/
7522-L76U].
2
See generally Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971) (providing an example of a
State’s suit against the federal government to determine navigability for title of waters).
3
In short, the public trust doctrine requires the state to hold navigable waters in trust
for the use of the citizens of that state, and to not dispose of those trust resources unless doing
so does not impair the interest of the people and where the disposal would serve the people’s
best interest. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).
4
See discussion infra Section II.
5
See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435 (noting that ownership of and dominion
and sovereignty over land covered by fresh water, within the limits of several states, belongs
to the respective states within which it is found); Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 900
(Utah 2008) (“While the public owns state waters, the beds that lie beneath those waters may
be privately owned.”); J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex rel. Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133,
1136–37 (Utah 1982) (holding that the public has recreational rights in the waters of a lake
even though it is entirely surrounded by a landowner’s private property).
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Analysis of a public trust issue in Utah comes with some unique difficulties.
First, unlike some states, Utah has not constitutionalized their public trust doctrine.6
This creates problems in deciding these issues because jurisprudence concerning the
public trust doctrine, as it exists in Utah now, is based on court decisions7 and
statutes,8 rather than constitutional text. Both of these sources of law provide
imperfect protection of the public’s right to the water and provide unstable footing
for a case seeking to challenge any impermissible restriction of the waters of the
state. Second, Utah’s rivers tend to be mountainous, obstructed, or low-flowing.9
This makes the determination of the river’s navigability for title purposes difficult,
as the traditional test for navigability requires some form of commercial use.10
Finally, for years private property owners, who have been paying taxes on
streambeds that cross their property, are concerned that the state’s upholding of
public trust protections for those rivers will allow citizens to come onto their private
property for recreational purposes, effectively extinguishing their right to exclude.11
According to private property owners, upholding the public’s right to use the waters
of the state, where they cross private land, implicates potential takings claims from
the government, title assurance issues for the defect of having a government
easement on the land years after the land was bought, and the inability to exercise
their right to exclude others from their land.12
6
Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public
Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 183 (2010).
7
See Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 652 (Utah
1937) (“The title [to public waters] is in the public; all are equal owners; that is, have coequal
rights therein, and one cannot obtain exclusive control thereof.”); J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136
(“Public ownership is founded on the principle that water, a scarce and essential resource in
this area of the country, is indispensable to the welfare of all the people; and the State must
therefore assume the responsibility of allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare
of the people of the State as a whole.”); Utah Stream Access Coal. v. Orange St. Dev., 416
P.3d 553, 565 (Utah 2017) (“Under United States Supreme Court precedent and our
constitution, the people of this State hold an interest in the lands held by the State under the
public trust doctrine, including land under navigable waters.”).
8
See UTAH CODE §§ 73-29-201 to -208 (2018).
9
National Water Information System: Web Interface, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
https://waterdata.usgs.gov/ut/nwis/current/?type=flow [https://perma.cc/KE32-FCBL] (last
visited Sept. 30, 2018).
10
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1871) superseded by statute, Clean Water Act,
Pub. L. No. 115-277, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), as recognized in Rapanos v. United States 547
U.S. 715 (2006); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435.
11
UTAH CODE § 73-29-201(1) (2018) (“The public may use a public water for
recreational activity if . . . the public water . . . is a navigable water; or . . . is on public
property; and . . . the recreational activity is not otherwise prohibited by law.”).
12
38 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d Easements not of record § 19 (1996) (“Agreement,
referenced in title commitment, to create an easement if, in the future, one was required, did
not place purchasers on notice of future easement, and thus did not preclude breach of
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This Note will provide a survey of relevant history and law relating to the public
trust doctrine, as well as the history and development of the public trust doctrine in
the state of Utah.13 Using this history, this Note will then argue that, based on federal
and state precedent and the relevant constitutional provisions, the courts should
recognize a constitutional right to use the waters of Utah for lawful recreational use,
regardless of who owns the lands beneath the waters.14
II. BACKGROUND
One of the major difficulties in dealing with public trust issues at law is that the
law itself is very old and often does not provide a relevant basis on which to
adjudicate modern issues.15 Moreover, this dated precedent was created to serve
public policies or protect public interests that are no longer commonly at issue.16 To
understand how modern public trust analysis works, one must know how the public
trust doctrine came to be and how it developed over the years.
A. Ancient Roots
The public trust doctrine has its roots in Roman law and philosophy.17 During
the formation of the Roman empire, the common conception of people’s right to use
natural resources rested on two main principles: First, our universe was created by a
divine being; and second, the divine being created air, water, land, and sunlight for
the coequal use of all people.18 Around the time of Cicero, in 100–25 B.C., this way
of thinking began to be codified in formal law.19 The codification rejected the view
that any individual could own—and exclude others from—the natural things
contract and negligence action against title company based on failure to include easement in
title commitment . . .”) (citing Izynski v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 963 N.E.2d 592 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012)).
13
See infra Part II.
14
See infra Part III.
15
See Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 654 (Utah
1937) (providing a discussion of an early public trust issue in Utah in which the main
considerations were agricultural and culinary uses of the stream in question). In contrast to
the Adams precedent, many modern concerns relating to the use of navigable waters in Utah
are based on recreational uses and property rights. The difference in the public’s ability to
use the waters of the state for purposes necessary for survival and the public’s ability to use
the waters for leisure makes many of the policy concerns supporting older precedent
somewhat less compelling to enforce a right to recreation.
16
See id. at 654.
17
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1968); see also Craig, supra note 6, at 59.
18
NORMAN E. BOWIE & ROBERT L. SIMON, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE POLITICAL
ORDER: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 55 (4th ed. 2007).
19
Id.
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necessary for human survival, primarily running water and air.20 Cicero was a prime
advocate for this idea, which he hoped would ensure that developing property laws
would not become the enemy of the common people.21 By 500 A.D., natural law
became the basis for many formal Roman Laws.22 According to the Roman Institutes
of the Justinian codex, “[b]y natural law common to all—the air, running water, the
sea, and consequently the sea-shore. No one therefore is forbidden access to the seashore . . . for these are not, like the sea itself, subject to the law of nations.”23
The historical roots of the public trust doctrine are not based on complex and
antiquated statutes, but on natural law; a simple, commonly held conception of what
the law ought to be.24 Since then, many leaps and bounds have been made in
technology and society, and the public trust doctrine has been codified by many
governing bodies in many ways.25 However, it is important to keep in mind the basic
system of equities upon which these codifications are based.
B. The Public Trust Doctrine in American Federal Law
The American system for establishing water rights did not change the equation
much. During the establishment of the American Colonies, water resources were
utilized in much the same way as in the Roman system of laws.26 After the American
Revolution, the newly established American government acquired the rights to
navigable streambeds from England and the governments of each state were granted
the rights to all the waters of their state, to be “held in trust for the people.”27 When
additional states were admitted to the Union, they were admitted on terms equal to

20

Id. at 57.
Id. at 55 (“There is indeed a law, right reason, which is in accordance with nature;
existing in all, unchangeable, eternal . . . It is not one thing at Rome, and another thing at
Athens . . . but it is law, eternal and immutable for all nations and for all time.”).
22
Id.
23
THOMAS COLLETT SANDARS, INSTITUTES OF THE JUSTINIAN, BOOK II OF THINGS 35
(J. B. Moyle trans., 4th ed.1906).
24
Id. at 565.
25
See generally Craig, supra note 6, at 93–194 (providing individualized background
on states’ public trust doctrines in the appendix). Many states have navigability tests which
are closely tied to the environmental exigencies of their state. For example, Alaska is the
only state which defines navigable waters as those waters which it is possible to land a
seaplane on. Id. at 75. Of course, the possibility of landing a sea plane is enough, courts do
not require brave seaplane pilots to actually land a plane on a borderline body of water to
determine navigability at trial.
26
See Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 654 (Utah
1937).
27
See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (“It is a title held in trust
for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties.”).
21
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those of the original thirteen colonies.28 This legal practice came to be known as the
equal footing doctrine.29 This doctrine granted all new states the title to tidal and
navigable waters as of the date those states joined the Union.30
1. Federal Ownership and the Definition of Navigability
The federal government’s Commerce Clause31 power provides that the
government may hold title to certain waterways based on their availability for
commercial use.32 The government preserves commercial freedom by regulating the
“channels” of interstate commerce.33 These channels include navigable waterways
on which commerce could occur.34 Therefore, the first step in any public trust
analysis is to determine whether the waters are navigable.35 If the waters are
navigable, U.S. Supreme Court precedent vests title to those waters in the state.36
However, this ownership is subject to certain duties.37 The primary duty is to
preserve the use of the navigable waterway as a channel of commerce.38 The
secondary duty is to use the water for the benefit of the citizens of the state.39
The federal test for navigability has undergone many changes to adapt both to
policy considerations of local government and citizens and the varying physical
properties of waterways.40 The original test for navigability comes from the Supreme

28

See Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842); see also Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 486 (1988).
29
See Craig, supra note 6, at 63.
30
See id.
31
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 3.
32
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
33
29 C.F.R. § 776.29 (2017).
34
Id.
35
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 562 (1870). This case examines the issue of
navigability extensively, and provides extensive accounts of the differences between
domestic streams, commercial rivers, and the historic English “tidal waters” test. Id. at 563–
64. Though The Daniel Ball was eventually superseded by statute, its text is still relevant in
this context to track the history of our definition of navigability for title purposes.
36
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).
37
See Craig, supra note 6, at 64–70.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See id. The original test for navigability, still used in some eastern states, is the tidal
ebb and flow test. Id. at 56. According to this test, waters which could be influenced by lunar
tides were navigable for title. Id. This test was problematic for western states, where such
bodies of water were few and far between. Id. at 64. As a result, the test became closely
linked to the ability of the waters to be used for commerce. Id. at 65. The particular character
of accepted commercial use varies greatly from state to state. Id. For example, in Montana
and Oregon, the accepted test is the ability to float railroad ties or timber down the river. Id.
at 140, 165.
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Court’s opinion in The Daniel Ball.41 This test takes a narrow definition of
commerce and restricts federal ownership to only those rivers which are navigable
by large commercial vessels. “[T]hey are navigable in fact when they are used, or
are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce,
over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade
and travel on water.”42 In this case, the Court found that the Grand River was
navigable because it was “capable of bearing a steamer of one hundred and twentythree tons burden, laden with merchandise and passengers, as far as Grand Rapids,
a distance of forty miles from its mouth in Lake Michigan.”43
The Daniel Ball set the first clear standard for navigability.44 However, a series
of cases followed this decision, which sought to clarify the federal standard of
navigability in a variety of contexts.45 The Montello, just four years later, broadened
the rule slightly, holding that a river need not be used for major commerce to be
considered navigable by the federal standard. “If it be capable in its natural state of
being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what mode the commerce may
be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes in law a public river or highway.”46
Additionally, in United States v. Utah, the Court took a firmer stance on the nature
of navigable waters. “The extent of existing commerce is not the test . . . . [W]here
conditions of exploration and settlement explain the infrequency or limited nature
of such use, the susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce may still be
satisfactorily proved.”47 Essentially, waters which were capable of being used for
commerce were considered navigable, regardless of the amount of commerce the
waters were actually used for.48 Later, Utah v. United States added the contour that
waters did not need to be actually engaged in that commerce in order to be
considered navigable by the federal test.49

41

The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 557 (1870); see also The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 437
(1874) (using the test articulated in The Daniel Ball).
42
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563.
43
Id. at 564.
44
Id. at 557.
45
See The Montello, 87 U.S. at 441–42 (clarifying the scope of the Court’s rule, and
holding that the correct test is not whether a river was capable of being navigated by steam
or sail vessels, but whether the public could use the river for purposes of transportation and
commerce in its natural state, regardless of the mode of commerce); Utah v. United States,
403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971) (holding that the Great Salt Lake satisfies the federal test for
navigability when ranchers used the lake as a highway to transport livestock).
46
The Montello, 87 U.S. at 441–42.
47
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931).
48
Id.
49
Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971) (providing that whether or not the waters
are currently being used in commerce, if they were capable of being used in commerce at the
time of statehood, those waters are considered navigable for title).
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2. Illinois Central Railroad v. United States and the Modern Public Trust Doctrine
The federal test for navigability, established in The Daniel Ball, The Montello,
and Utah v. United States, created the principal that some streambeds were owned
by the state and some were not.50 However, this line of cases mainly dealt with the
clarification of title issues.51 The question of what exactly a state should do once a
court determines that they have title to a streambed remained open until 1892 when
the Court decided Illinois Central Railway Company v. Illinois.52 This case
established the public trust doctrine in modern law by first acknowledging the duty
that states owed to the federal government to keep waterways open for commerce,53
and second, by establishing the states’ duty to “preserve such waters for the use of
the public.”54
Illinois Central created the mandate for states to establish a public trust doctrine
to preserve the public’s interest in fishing, navigation, and commerce.55 The case
established that
[t]he control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost,
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the
public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment
of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.56
This quotation illustrates two contentious points in modern case law: states have title
to navigable waters to hold those waters in trust for the people, and the state may not
abdicate its duty under the trust.57 However, the state may “dispose” of lands, so
50

See id. at 14 (holding that since the lake was navigable at the time Utah became a
state, Utah’s claim of ownership overrode any claim of the United States); The Daniel Ball,
77 U.S. 557, 557 (1870) (“[T]hey constitute navigable waters of the United States[,] . . . in
contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form their ordinary
condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which
commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreigin countries in the customary
modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.”); The Montello, 87 U.S. at 443–45
(holding that the Ordinance of 1787 was not needed to establish or preserve the national
character of the rivers because of their importance for communication and commerce).
51
See, e.g., Utah, 403 U.S. at 9–10 (characterizing the nature of the claim as “Utah’s
claim to the lands is premised on the navigability of the lake”).
52
146 U.S. 387 (1892).
53
Id. at 435.
54
Id. at 453.
55
Id. at 435.
56
Id. at 453.
57
See Melissa K. Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine: A Lakeside View
into the Trustees’ World, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 133 (2012). Though this article specifically
discusses Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine, the requirements on the trustee to preserve the
waters for use of the people remain largely the same from state to state. See also Ill. Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. at 435.
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long as doing so serves the best interest of the citizens of the state for whom the trust
is held.58 A classic example of permissible disposal of these lands is the practice of
selling portions of navigable water to private companies on the condition that those
companies build a dock to enhance the ability of the public to use the waters for
commerce.59 The key is that the state may not take any action, which may have the
effect of damaging the public’s interest in the use of the waters in question.60 If it
would serve the public better to dispose of the waters and grant title to a third party,
the state may do so under Illinois Central.61
Another key point in Illinois Central is that each state is left to establish its own
public trust doctrine.62 As a result, individual states’ public trust doctrines differ
considerably.63 As such, when bringing a public trust lawsuit in a given state, it is
not enough to pull sources from federal precedent and to have an understanding of
what other states are doing because what works in one state may be illegal in
another.64
C. History of Utah’s Public Trust Doctrine
Thus far, this Note has provided a brief background of public trust principals
relevant to federal law and the doctrine’s broader history. This information greatly
informs how Utah has developed and has come to manage its own public trust
doctrine, which is relevant to understanding how Utah courts will handle this issue.
This section will examine the unique jurisprudential background and geographic
characteristics of Utah and how those factors played in Utah’s modern conception
of public trust law.

58

See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 47 (1894).
See id. (holding that a state granting title to a private party so that the party could
build a dock on the public waterway was a disposal of the trust for the benefit of the people,
and therefore allowable in light of the Illinois Central mandate to administer the trust for the
benefit of the people).
60
Id.
61
This is another sticking point in modern litigation of public trust issues. All Illinois
Central says is that a state must hold the waters in trust for the people and may dispose of
the waters so long as doing so does not affect the peoples’ interest in using the water. See
Illinois ex rel. Hunt v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 184 U.S. 77 (1902). Cases subsequent to Illinois
Central establish that, so long as the disposal serves the best interest of the public, a state
may in fact dispose of the waters. Mere disposal of the waters does not indicate prima facie
abdication of the duties under the trust, the abdication must actually harm the public’s interest
in the waters. See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012).
62
See PPL Montana, LLC, 565 U.S. at 603 (“Unlike the equal-footing doctrine,
however, which is the constitutional foundation for the navigability rule of riverbed title, the
public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law . . . .”).
63
See Craig, supra note 6, at 71–91.
64
See Craig, supra note 6, at 94–194.
59
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Under the equal footing doctrine, title to navigable waters within the State of
Utah was vested in the Utah government at the time of statehood, on January 4,
1896.65 Once these rights vested, the government of the State of Utah was
responsible for creating proper safeguards to ensure that the state—as trustee—
upheld its duties under the public trust doctrine.
1. Public Trust Protections in Utah’s Constitution
Utah has not constitutionalized its public trust doctrine, unlike some other
states.66 This is problematic because when parties sue claiming a right to access
public waters, they cannot argue that the right has a constitutional basis, which
makes it easier for the courts and legislature to limit public access to state waters.67
However, while Utah never expressly constitutionalized its public trust doctrine,
certain articles of the Utah Constitution are relevant to the issue. For example,
Article XX, section 1 states, “[a]ll lands of the State that have been . . . granted to
the State . . . are declared to be the public lands of the State; and shall be held in trust
for the people . . . for the respective purposes for which they [were] . . . acquired.”68
This provision problematically leaves waters out of its consideration and thus falls
just short of being a perfect constitutional expression of the public trust doctrine for
protecting water rights.69 However, the protection of lands otherwise acquired by the
State provides an important foothold for arguing for the protection of the public’s
interest in water rights.
Additionally, in Article XVII, section 1, the Utah Constitution provides
protections for existing water rights for beneficial uses: “All existing rights to the
use of any of the waters in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose, are hereby
recognized and confirmed.”70 This provision likewise falls short of being a perfect
expression of public trust law, but only because it does not explicitly state it is
protecting these rights pursuant to the public trust.71

65

See PPL Montana, LLC, 565 U.S. at 580 (“The question is whether discrete,
identifiable segments of these rivers in Montana were nonnavigable, as federal law defines
that concept for purposes of determining whether the State acquired title to the riverbeds
underlying those segments, when the State entered the Union . . . .”); Quick Facts,
UTAH.GOV, https://www.utah.gov/about/quickfacts.html [https://perma.cc/WL6A-MUA8]
(last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
66
See Craig, supra note 6, at 93–194 (providing a comprehensive summary of various
State’s public trust doctrine at the time the article was written).
67
See Scanlan, supra note 57, at 132–34 (providing that, in Wisconsin, the legislature
has a constitutional duty to protect the public’s right to access waters, which means closer
judicial scrutiny is applied to statutes that endanger the public’s interest in the trust).
68
UTAH CONST. art. XX, §1.
69
See Craig, supra note 6, at 83–88.
70
UTAH CONST. art. XVII, §1.
71
See Craig, supra note 6, at 132.
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Finally, in Article XI, section 6, Utah’s Constitution provides a strong
admonition to municipal corporations, restricting their ability to dispose of or
alienate certain water rights. “No municipal corporation, shall directly or
indirectly . . . dispose of any . . . water rights” and water rights should “be devoted
in like manner to the public supply of its inhabitants.”72 This provision supports the
notion that the government should not dispose of water rights in any way that harms
the public’s interest in those rights. In this way, it is quite similar to the initial
pronouncement of the public trust doctrine in Illinois Central, which required the
states to hold water rights in trust for the people.73
None of these provisions alone provide a clean constitutional expression of
Utah’s public trust doctrine. However, the policies they promote and the specific
language they use leave plenty of room to argue that the public trust is confirmed
under Utah’s Constitution.
2. Key Cases in Utah’s Public Trust History
In the absence of any explicit constitutional expression of Utah’s public trust
doctrine, much of the defining law on the issue comes from cases dating back almost
one hundred years.74 While many of the cases deal with the public trust doctrine in
passing, a few cases make concrete determinations about the nature of the public’s
ownership of water rights that are still relevant today. This section will examine a
few of the quintessential Utah cases dealing with the public trust doctrine from the
oldest case to the newest.
(a) Adams v. Portage Irr., Reservoir & Power Co.75
The court in Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co. provides
Utah’s first real expression of the public trust doctrine.76 In the case, Utah-based
shepherds who owned grazing lands in Box Elder County sued the Portage
Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Company to establish “the right of plaintiffs to the
use of part of the waters of certain springs in Portage Canyon for culinary and stock

72

UTAH CONST. art. XI, §6.
See Scanlan, supra note 57, at 130–33. Though Scanlan’s Article specifically
discusses Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine, the requirements of the trustee to preserve the
waters for use of the people remain largely the same from state to state. See also Ill. Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).
74
E.g., Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648 (Utah 1937);
Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co., 67 P. 672 (Utah 1902) (providing
examples of the history of cases which are helpful in analyzing the history of the public trust
doctrine in Utah).
75
Adams, 72 P.2d at 648.
76
Id.
73
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watering purposes and to enjoin defendants from interfering with plaintiffs’ use
thereof.”77
The first beneficial point Adams makes is to confirm that the public has coequal
rights to the waters, and those rights must be protected by the state government, who
holds title to those waters through the equal footing doctrine for purposes of the
trust.78 “The title [to public waters] thereto is in the public; all are equal owners; that
is, have coequal rights therein, and one cannot obtain exclusive control thereof.
These waters are the gift of Providence; they belong to all as nature placed them or
made them available.”79 The proposition that the public right to waters is coequal
and not able to be exclusively controlled by one person is an essential piece of the
public trust analysis, which is based on well-established social-contract based
human rights theory.80 If the public has these rights, then any private or public action
which restricts the public’s access to navigable waters would directly violate the
trust and would be invalid under Adams.
Adams additionally explains how water rights can be privately acquired.81
Understanding the acquisition of water rights in the abstract is helpful in grasping
the contours of the public trust doctrine’s work in practice. When faced with the
concept that the public possesses coequal and nonexclusive rights to the corpus of
the water, the clear follow-up question would be: But people obtain water rights all
the time, how does that work if nobody can claim exclusive control of the water?
The key is in understanding the difference between diverted and “wild” waters.
“Having thus captured the ‘wild [waters],’ [a person] acquires a property right . . .
as long as [he or she] maintains . . . possession.”82 Due to water’s complex physical
properties,83 proving ownership of a moving river would be very difficult. Therefore,
in Utah, to own water is not to own the corpus of the water itself, but the right to
divert the water for use.84 But once the water is reduced to a form or state where it
can be measured and accounted for, it is possible to acquire property rights to it.85
However, the water in a natural river is decidedly beyond human control, and
therefore is the coequal property of the citizens of the state.86
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Id. at 650.
See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435; PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S.
576, 592 (2012) (“For state title under the equal-footing doctrine, navigability is determined
at the time of statehood and based on the ‘natural and ordinary condition’ of the water.”
(citations omitted)).
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Adams, 72 P.2d at 652.
80
See BOWIE & SIMON, supra note 18, at 55.
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Finally, Adams gives a nod to the Utah Constitution in determining public
ownership of the state’s waters. “This right of the public, as well as the rights of the
appropriator, were confirmed by the State Constitution in article 17: All existing
rights to the use of any of the waters in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose,
are hereby recognized and confirmed.”87 Adams goes on to define beneficial use as
“the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this state.”88
In providing this ruling, the court in Adams did three major things. First, it confirmed
that the undiverted waters in the State of Utah are the coequal property of the citizens
of Utah and distinguished ownership of diverted water from purported ownership of
“wild” waters.89 Second, it acknowledged a constitutional basis for the extension of
this right to use the water for beneficial uses.90 And third, the Adams court defined
beneficial uses under the constitutional provision and provided that any use of waters
that is not beneficial and economic will not supersede the right of the public to use
and enjoy those waters.91
(b) J.J.N.P. v. State, By and Through Division of Wildlife Services92
In the era after Adams, the coequal public right to the corpus of the water and
distinctions in ownership were well accepted, but provisions for precisely how the
public could use the waters were still a source of debate.93 The Utah Supreme Court
addressed this issue in J.J.N.P. v. State, By and Through Division of Wildlife
Services, and held that a “corollary of the proposition that the public owns the water
is the rule that there is a public easement over the water regardless of who owns the
water beds beneath the water.”94
The birth of the idea that the easement creates the public right to use the water,
regardless of who owns the beds beneath the water, marked a huge turning point in
the law.95 Essentially, the easement grants the public the right to float on the water
wherever it may naturally flow, regardless of whether the waters are navigable.96
This means that those private landowners who own the area around a nonnavigable
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Id. at 653 (quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 654 (citation omitted).
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J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex rel. Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982).
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See generally Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957 (Utah 1943) (discussing the propriety
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Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 140 (Wyo. 1961) (discussing a claim that the public has a right to
use the bed and channel of a river for fishing and recreational purposes, and defendant may
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See id.; Day, 362 P.2d at 145.
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stream have no legal right to exclude the public from floating on a stream that passes
through the landowner’s property.97
Additionally, J.J.N.P. characterizes the easement as a “corollary of the
proposition that the public owns the water.”98 The term “corollary” has its roots in
mathematics and means “something that naturally follows.”99 The use of this word
strongly suggests that the corollary easement to use the waters has existed for as
long as the public has held the rights to the waters or since the equal footing doctrine
granted those water rights to the state.
Finally, J.J.N.P. provides strong language reinforcing the public trust doctrine
in Utah. “Public ownership is founded on the principle that water, a scarce and
essential resource . . . is indispensable to the welfare of all the people . . . . The
doctrine of public ownership is the basis upon which the State regulates the use of
water for the benefit and well-being of the people.”100 In this quotation, the court
provides support for the “beneficial use” theory of water usage. It also reinforces the
specific exigencies of Utah’s climate and agricultural industry, which necessitate the
existence of protections for public use of water in order to support Utah’s
agricultural economy.
J.J.N.P. provides two major legal footholds for future arguments: First, it
confirms the existence of a corollary easement for the public to use the corpus of the
water regardless of who owns the streambeds below.101 Second, it reinforces the
policy concerns that necessitate the public’s ability to use waters freely.102 However,
J.J.N.P.’s legacy left the public and the legislature confused on how exactly the
public could use the waters.103 The confusion came with J.J.N.P.’s use of the word
“utilize” when describing the easement’s protection of the public’s activities on the
waters. “Irrespective of the ownership of the bed and navigability of the water, the
public, if it can obtain lawful access to a body of water, has the right to . . . participate
in any lawful activity when utilizing that water.”104 The problem this created was
97

Id.
Id.
99
Corollary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
corollary [https://perma.cc/5Z79-9EDA] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
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J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136.
101
Id. (“A corollary of the proposition that the public owns the water is the rule that
there is a public easement over the water regardless of who owns the water beds beneath the
water.”).
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Id. (“Public ownership is founded on the principle that water, a scarce and essential
resource in this area of the country, is indispensable to the welfare of all the people; and the
State must therefore assume the responsibility of allocating the use of the water for the
benefit and welfare of the people of the State as a whole.”).
103
See Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 901 (Utah 2008) (“Instead, we established
our own rule that the public has ‘the right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in
any lawful activity when utilizing that water.’ The interpretive difference turns on [this]
single, significant word.” (internal citations omitted)).
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J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1137 (emphasis added).
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similar to the problem addressed by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Day—which
discussed the ways that ambiguous language regarding the use of the easement could
create only the right to float on top of the water as opposed to the right to tread on
the riverbed.105 By using the word “utilize” the J.J.N.P. court effectively broadened
the easement through ambiguity to allow the public to tread on the streambeds as
well, if doing so was necessary to “utilizing” the water.106 As a result, the public
could now walk up privately owned riverbeds, stand on those beds to fish or float
the rivers, and otherwise occupy privately owned land without repercussion.107
Several years later, some of those private landowners took the issue to the court
again.108
(c) Conatser v. Johnson109
The plaintiffs in Conatser were river rafting on a portion of a stream that was
privately owned.110 The plaintiffs were floating the river where it was deep and
walking on the streambed where it was shallow.111 The private owner of the stream
confronted the plaintiffs, telling them to exit the stream immediately.112 The
Conatsers refused and were subsequently prosecuted for criminal trespass.113 The
Conatsers sought to clarify the scope of the easement created by J.J.N.P.114 PostJ.J.N.P., the public’s easement was generally interpreted broadly to cover lawful
recreational activities which necessitated stepping on the beds of the stream.115
However, private landowners looked to the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in
Day and argued that it restricted use of the riverbeds only to incidental “scraping”
that may occur while floating a raft.116 Ultimately, the Conatser court clarified the
J.J.N.P. standard for the easement. “[T]ouching the water’s bed is reasonably
necessary and convenient for the effective enjoyment of the public’s easement . . . .
The practical reality is that the public cannot effectively enjoy its right to ‘utilize’
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See Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 149–51 (Wyo. 1961) (noting that, though the
court ultimately held that the public had the right to tread on the streambed, the court noted
that vagueness in statutory language regarding the public’s rights to use waters creates
serious problems in the application of the penal law—in this case the law of trespass).
106
J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1137.
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See, e.g., Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897 (Utah 2008).
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Id. at 899.
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Id. at 902 (“The practical reality is that the public cannot effectively enjoy its right
to ‘utilize’ the water to engage in recreational activities without touching the water’s bed.”).
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See Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145–46 (Wyo. 1961).
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the water . . . without touching the water’s bed.”117 This quotation establishes a very
broad easement that allows the public to essentially walk on any streambed, whether
publicly or privately owned, incidental to lawful use.118 This means that no private
landowner may legally exclude someone from stepping on the beds of their privately
owned stream, so long as that person is engaged in a “lawful activity” that requires
utilization of the water.119
Additionally, the court in Conatser took steps to clarify the public’s easement
to use these streambeds as an interest in land. “[A]n easement ‘gives rise to two
distinct property interests: a “dominant estate,” that has [the] right to use land of
another, and a “servient estate,” that permits the exercise of that use.’”120
Characterizing the easement as an interest in the land of the streambed rather than
the body of the water is an important clarification in Conatser. The J.J.N.P.
easement was a corollary of the public ownership of the water, and it was unclear
whether the easement was the right to use the water or the streambed.121 Without
knowing what actual property the public had an interest in, it was difficult to
adjudicate properly the rights at stake. Moreover, characterizing the easement as a
corollary interest in land which has existed in tandem for as long as the public has
enjoyed coequal ownership of the waters of the state has important constitutional
ramifications.122
In response to the broad scope of the Conatser easement, Utah’s legislature
enacted the Public Waters Access Act (PWAA).123 The PWAA allows an individual
who owns private land through which a public waterway flows to restrict the public’s
access to the waterway.124 The tension between the Conatser easement and the
PWAA has created widespread confusion concerning whether the public has access
to certain public waterways.125 In response to this confusion, the Utah Supreme
Court in Utah Stream Access Coalition v. Orange Street Development126 took the
PWAA’s side and held that Conatser was an incorrect statement of the public’s
easement to use public waters.127
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(d) Utah Stream Access Coalition v. Orange Street Development
In Orange Street, the Utah Stream Access Coalition sought to enjoin a group
of private landowners from barring their right to access public waters.128 The parties,
however, did not assert a quiet title claim, and therefore the court did not rule on
whether the river was a public waterway under the PWAA.129 The court instead
conducted an analysis of the federal and state standards for navigability. The court
found that the federal standard for navigability, which contemplated navigability at
the time of statehood, was incorporated into the statute.130 In doing so, the court
acknowledged that, at least temporally, the determination of navigability is tied to
the equal footing doctrine, rather than modern characteristics of waterways.131 This
necessarily means that the standard of navigability as contemplated by the statute is
also temporally rooted in conditions at the time of statehood.132
This opinion, however, falls just short of granting the public the right to access
the section of the Weber River at issue in the case.133 The court noted that because
the parties did not raise a quiet title claim, the court would not quiet title to the Weber
River, even though the opinion acknowledged ample evidence suggesting that the
section of river is navigable, and therefore state-owned under the statute.134
However, under the statute, even if the waterway was navigable and public, the
owner of the property surrounding the public waterway could still exclude the public
from accessing the waters.135 If a Utah court were to acknowledge a constitutional
basis for the right to access public waters, this problematic exclusion of the public
from waters the public ostensibly owns could provide the necessary basis for
challenging the PWAA in the future.136
(e) Utah Stream Access Coalition v. VR Acquisitions
In VR Acquisitions, the Utah Supreme Court once again addressed the nature
of the public’s interest in waters of the State of Utah.137 The Court ultimately
declined to rule on the constitutional nature of the public’s easement to use waters
of the state.138 Instead, the Court took the opportunity to, once again, clarify that the
128
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Conatser decision was based on “common-law easement principles.”139 In doing so,
the Court held that the district court erred in treating the Conatser easement as being
constitutionally based, but declined to rule on the constitutionality of the easement
itself.140 The Court then went on to discuss, in dicta, some of the constitutional
arguments which the Utah Stream Access Coalition had presented, without
definitively ruling on any of them.141
The Court first examined the Conatser easement and the current landscape of
Public Trust Law. This easement, the Court clarified, was recognized in order to
balance the interests of landowners and the public, and was based on common-law
principles rather than constitutional interpretation.142 Indeed, the Court in Conatser
did not conduct any historical analysis of the constitutional basis of the easement at
all.143 As such, when the Utah Stream Access Coalition relied on Conatser on appeal,
they relied on the implication that the Conatser easement must be constitutionally
based, rather than any explicit discussion of the constitutional basis for the
easement.144 This was a stretch that the Court was not willing to make in VR
Acquisitions, and the Court makes it clear that it will require much more than the
implication present in Conatser to make a constitutional holding on the nature of the
easement.145 Specifically, the inquiry must focus on “the scope of the public
understanding of ‘lands of the State’ as of the time of the framing of the Utah
Constitution.”146
Moving forward from VR Acquisitions, the Court has indicated an openness to
recognizing a constitutional basis for the public’s easement, provided that it is
properly presented to the Court.147 This presentation must include an examination of
the historical understanding of the public’s interest at the time the Utah Constitution
was ratified in 1896.148
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III. ANALYSIS
This Note has thus provided an account of the relevant history and precedent,
both state and federal, affecting the public trust analysis in the State of Utah. The
remainder of this Note will examine the public’s constitutional right to touch
privately owned streambeds incidental to lawful recreation as a right protected under
the Utah Constitution.
A. Constitutional Protection Under Art. XVII, Section 1
The Utah Constitution protects existing rights to use the waters of the state, in
that “[a]ll existing rights to the use of any of the waters in this State for any useful
or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized and confirmed.”149 Under the equal
footing doctrine, Utah received title to the waters of the state, to hold those waters
in trust for the people, at the time Utah was granted statehood in 1896.150 Adams
stands for the proposition that, “[t]hese waters are the gift of Providence; they belong
to all as nature placed them or made them available.”151
This quotation refers to the philosophical, if not theological, basis for holding
that the public enjoys coequal ownership of the waters.152 The court in J.J.N.P. then
established that the easement to utilize the water for lawful recreational purposes is
a corollary of this right.153 If the easement results from a natural law right, and is
therefore tied to the legal proposition that the public has a right to the waters of the
state, then the easement would have been recognized and confirmed as an “existing
right” under Article XVII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution when it was ratified in
1895.154 If the easement is constitutionally guaranteed, that means any attempt to
limit the public’s ability to utilize the waters for lawful recreational use is subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny.155 The notion that the easement has its basis in natural
law is supported by Utah’s long tradition of recognizing the right to use water as
belonging to the people since the days of the pioneers, and by the court’s consistent
holdings that public ownership of the waters has always been the law.156
149
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B. Constitutional Protection Under Art. XX, Section 1
Article XX, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides “[a]ll lands of the State
that have been . . . granted to the State by Congress, and all lands acquired . . . are
declared to be the public lands of the State; and shall be held in trust for the
people.”157 As established in Conatser, the easement constitutes an interest in
land,158 and as such, if it were acquired by the state, the easement should be entitled
to constitutional protections under Article XX, section 1.159
The common counter-argument is that the rights created in J.J.N.P. were
judicially created, and could not have been affirmed by the constitution or acquired
by the state because the state never took any affirmative action to accept
responsibility for the easement.160 This argument, however, ignores the
jurisprudential background of the public trust doctrine and the plain language in both
J.J.N.P. and Conatser. Both cases discuss the right as being a “corollary” or
necessary part of the right.161 Based on this language, the easement must have existed
as long as the right, and the right has existed, at least in Utah, since the time of
statehood.
C. Constitutional Recognition of the Public’s Right and Takings Claims
Easements, even implied easements, are property interests protected from
taking under Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution.162 This assertion supports
two propositions. First, easements are in fact an interest in land, and therefore subject
157
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See Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899 (Utah 2008) (providing that the public
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waters.
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to analysis under Article XX. Second, the counter-argument that the J.J.N.P.
easement was a taking against private landowners is unsound. This is because the
easement is a corollary to the natural law and has always existed.163 Assuming that
the easement is based on natural law and has always existed, there is no potential for
a takings claim here. The fact that the easement has existed as long as the public’s
right has existed means that no property actually changed hands between private
landowners and the government. The analysis for a takings claim requires some sort
of government action against the landowner.164 If the easement has existed since
statehood, the government would have taken no action against private landowners
because the easement was established at the same time the state government was
established.
Arguing for the proposition that the easement has always existed, and therefore
cannot be a taking, opens an entirely separate can of worms in the area of title
insurance claims. When a title insurance company insures title to a parcel of land,
they do so as a warrant that the land is unencumbered by any title defects.165 A
holding that the easement was a constitutionally protected interest in land which has
existed since the time of statehood essentially means that every parcel of land with
a river running through it, regardless of navigability, would have been encumbered
by this easement.166 In other words, the unintended side effect of holding that the
easement is subject to constitutional protections, is the possibility of a wave of title
insurance claims and landowners seeking to recover taxes paid on streambeds
crossing their lands.
D. How the State Is Authorized to Manage the Trust
Because the easement is arguably a constitutionally recognized right under
Article XVII, section 1, Utah’s common-law public trust doctrine should govern the
regulation of public waters “as trustee for the benefit of the people.”167 The precedent
on the federal side supports a “substantial impairment” test—i.e., the state may
dispose of public trust rights for the benefit of the public trust when there is no
substantial impairment to the public’s interest.168 In Illinois Central, the U.S.
Supreme Court established that the state can dispose of trust lands so long as there
163

See supra Sections II.A, II.B; see also PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S.
576, 601–03 (2012) (holding that the relevant inquiry of Public Trust rights should focus on
the legal landscape at the time of statehood).
164
See Martinez, supra note 162, at 15.
165
See 38 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, Proof of Title Insurance Claims, § 19 (2017).
166
See Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899–900 (Utah 2008).
167
J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex rel. Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982).
168
See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (“It is the settled law of
this country that the ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide
waters, within the limits of the several states, belong to the respective States within which
they are found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that
can be done without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters . . . .”).

2019]

PURE AS RUNNING WATER

501

is no “substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters
remaining.”169 The cases following Illinois Central support a need for the disposal
of the public trust rights to benefit the public, such as the disposal of shoreland to a
private party that they might build a publicly accessible dock.170 Although Article
XX does not include a substantial impairment test, it still provides that the lands
acquired by the state are held in trust.171 Using the Illinois Central test, the state must
neither dispose of the rights in a way which substantially impairs the public’s interest
nor do so in a way that does not serve the public interest.172
If a court were not to apply the Illinois Central test and instead were to rely on
a careful reading of Article XX of the Utah Constitution, it would find no express
substantial impairment or public benefit requirement. Instead, the state would have
extensive authority to “dispose of” the land (or the easement as an interest in land)
as may be provided by law.173 To provide such broad legislative power would be
against both the long-standing principle that the state holds title to the waters of the
state in the public trust and that the public has a right to access the waters.
A close reading of Illinois Central requires the state to dispose of the lands in
a way that is for the benefit of the public trust. Moreover, the state must do so in a
way that does not create a substantial impairment of the remaining waters. This
seems to be the best way to establish the scope of the legislature’s ability to dispose
of the easement, rather than relying solely on the expansive language of Article XX.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the unique legal background of Utah’s public trust doctrine, the
public’s easement to touch streambeds of rivers in Utah, regardless of their status as
public or private lands, merits constitutional protection. The reason for this is simple:
The state holds its waters in trust for the benefit of the public. A corollary of the
public’s ownership of the waters of the state is an easement that allows the public to
use those waters for lawful recreation and to—incidental to those activities—touch
the beds of those streams. Because this easement is a corollary to the original
doctrine of public ownership, it was confirmed as an “existing right” under Article
XVII, section 1. Additionally, because the easement is an interest in land, the
easement itself was “otherwise acquired” by the state under the equal footing
doctrine and Article XX, section 1. Once the easement was acquired by the state, the
state had the duty to maintain that easement for the benefit of the public and could
not dispose of the easement if doing so did not benefit the public or if it substantially
hindered the public’s interest in the waters. Despite these protections, the state may
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still dispose of the easement, as well as the publicly owned beds of navigable rivers,
if doing so served the interest of the public as a whole.
As of today, public trust law in Utah is unclear and subject to change by the
legislature or Supreme Court precedent. With the growth of privatized recreation
companies that may seek to restrict access to certain parts of rivers for fishing or
rafting and to only allow access to fee-paying members, it is vital that Utah establish
ironclad legal doctrine protecting the public’s right to access the waters they
coequally own. Recognizing a constitutional basis for this easement is the best way
to achieve this goal.

